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Traditions and True Successors: A Few Pragmatic Considerations 
Martin Beckstein, University of Zurich 
 
Building upon previous work by John Williams, David-Hillel Ruben has launched an 
exciting discussion about traditions and true successors that Williams and Ruben 
themselves, as well as Samuel Lebens and Jonathan Payton, have taken several steps 
further. In particular, I consider Payton’s proposal for the concept of inheritance of a 
tradition through a causal-similarity chain convincing (Payton 2013a, 43 “Inheritance*”). 
While I also concur with Payton in regard to his proposed modifications of Ruben’s 
initial concept of true succession (Payton 2013a, 41 “Successor*”), I suggest that some 
further modifications be made. These modifications include, on the one hand, that we 
incorporate a causal connection into the concept of true successorhood and, on the other 
hand, that we exclude the possibility that a true successor may develop a retrograde or 
degenerate version of the predecessor’s cultural heritage. Moreover, I propose to make a 
small change in the wording, in order to make the concept slightly more flexible and 
perhaps accommodate to some extent a point made by Lebens. (This change in the 
wording should, analogically and for the same reasons, be made with regard to the 
concept of inheritance of a tradition.)  
 
The reason for proposing these modifications have, in my view, all to do with the basic 
puzzle that has motivated Ruben's reflections in the first place: Why, and under what 
conditions, do potentially violent social disputes about true succession or (true) 
inheritance of a tradition emerge? I therefore recall the basic issue of interest that 
motivates (and justifies) the on-going discussion before I briefly explain the modification 
in the concept of true succession that I propose to make, and its implications for an 
answer to the basic question of the discussion. 
 
The Puzzle 
 
Ruben started the discussion on the basis of the observation, that often two or more 
parties each claim that they, but not its rival(s), are the true or faithful successors of some 
earlier person or group (or the rightful inheritor of a tradition). Such disputes, Ruben 
further observed, occasionally take the form of social conflicts, with the individual 
members of the rival parties being even willing to die for the cause. In the light of these 
observations, Ruben suggests that philosophical reflections about true succession and 
traditions have a twofold goal: Firstly, a conceptual structure that facilitates the analysis 
of disputes over true successorhood and inheritance of a tradition must be developed. 
And secondly, a convincing explanation must be provided, as to why such disputes are so 
intractable (Ruben 2013a, 32). The latter, of course, constitutes the justification of the 
whole enterprise, as an explanation is probably the best thing that (analytic) philosophers 
can provide to help understand and mitigate such conflicts. 
 
The explanation that Ruben then gives is that vagueness, rather than ambiguity, lies at the 
core of disputes over true succession or inheritance of a tradition. Claims to true 
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successorhood (or membership of a tradition) are essentially contestable because true 
succession (and membership in a tradition), like similarity, is a non-transitive and many-
one relation (see also Williams 2013, 43). 
 
The Conceptual Structure 
 
For the task of developing a conceptual structure that deals with such social disputes, I 
consider Payton’s (2013a, 43 “Inheritance*”) proposal to define the concept of 
inheritance of a tradition through a causal-similarity chain convincing, and therefore 
agree to adopt it: 
 
True Inheritor of a Tradition:1 Y is a true inheritor of a tradition T iff (i) 
there is some X that originates T, (ii) SX and SY stand on opposite chains of 
SS (which may include only SX and SY), (iii) each link Sn is developed after 
Sn-1, (iv) each link Sn is qualitatively similar, to a very high degree, to Sn-1, 
and (v) the holder of Sn develops Sn because the holder of Sn-1 develops Sn-
1. 
 
For the conceptual structure to be complete, we need a concept of true successorhood. 
Again Payton’s preferred version (Payton, 2013, 41 “Successor*”) is very attractive. 
Nevertheless, I propose to adopt it in a modified version: 
 
True Successor: Y is a true successor of X iff there is a set of beliefs 
and/or practices SX and a set of beliefs and/or practices SY such that, (i) Y 
develops SY after X develops SX, (ii) SY is qualitatively similar, to a very 
high degree, to SX, (iii) SY is either an updated or a consistently advanced, 
but not a retrograde version of SX, and (iv) Y develops SY because X has 
developed SX. 
 
Hence, I recommend to modify Payton’s Successor* in three respects:  
 
1)  With (iii) I specify the possible forms that the qualitatively similar set 
of beliefs and/or practices of the successor may take in comparison to 
the set of beliefs and/or practices of the predecessor, if we are to 
speak of true successorhood. 
2)  With (iv) I incorporate a causal connection into the concept. 
3)  I supplement the grammatical conjunction “and” with an exclusive 
“or”. 
 
Combined, the two concepts imply that a true successor Y is not necessarily also a true 
inheritor of the tradition generated by X. If the tradition generated by X has been carried 
on by a number of others, SY is the true successor of to SX, but lack the necessary 
1 “S” signifies a set of beliefs and(/or) practices. 
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qualitative similarity to SY-1. Analogically, a true inheritor of the tradition generated by X 
is not necessarily a true successor of X as the qualitative similarity required for the 
inheritor refers to SY-1, which may be SX, but also some intermediate Sn if the chain 
includes links in between of SX and SY. 
 
Modification 1 
 
(iii) SY is either an updated or a consistently advanced, but not a 
retrograde version of SX, 
 
Williams (2013, 43) argues against Ruben that we should exclude the option of 
retrograde versions because true succession is, in his view, a term of praise. I think that 
we are well-advised to follow Williams’s proposal and exclude retrograde versions from 
the concept, even if his argument were to be wrong: No person or group will ever raise a 
claim to true successorhood by asserting to have developed a retrograde (or degenerate) 
version of the earlier set of beliefs and/or practices. Consequently, no potentially violent 
social dispute will arise, and we need not multiply the range of potential candidates for 
true successorhood. The same obviously applies to the plagiarizer who hopes that his 
theft of ideas will go undetected. 
 
Claimants to true successorhood will justify their claim to true successorhood either by 
declaring that they have consistently advanced the predecessor’s set of beliefs and/or 
practices; or, for instance, if the assumption is made that the predecessor’s teaching 
cannot be improved and hence, every substantial change in the predecessor’s set of 
beliefs and/or practices will, from this claimant’s perspective, constitute a distortion, a 
claimant may hold that true successors just need to make sure that the predecessor’s 
teaching is in keeping with the times. That is, it may be argued that the true successor’s 
task is to ensure that SY has the same meaning in the world in which Y lives (WY) as SX 
had in WX (cf. Ruben 2013a, 38). Pace Williams (2013, 44), then, a true successor’s set 
of beliefs and/or practices need not constitute an advanced version of the predecessor, but 
merely a timely update. In fact, the propositional content of SX and SY may even be 
identical. In this case, the claimant to true successorhood will (have to) argue that no 
relevant sociological changes have occurred since the time in which X developed SX. (I.e. 
SY in WY corresponds to Sx in WX because SY is identical with SX and WY is, in the 
relevant respects, identical with WX). An example may be given with Jehova’s Witnesses, 
who claim that the Bible must be taken literally, but needs to be preached in translation 
because Jesus evangelized the people in their native tongue. 
 
Modification 2 
 
(iv) SY develops SY because X has developed SX. 
 
Ruben’s (and Payton’s, but see Payton 2013b, 19) reason for not integrating a causal 
connection into the concept of true successorhood, as Williams (1988, 161; 2013, 44) 
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proposes, is that he wants to include the conceivable case in which a later group happens 
to develop the same set of beliefs and/or practices as an earlier group without having 
been influenced by that earlier group (Ruben 2013a, 38). As an empirical example, 
Ruben cites certain groups of anti-global capitalist activists that display, as he suggests, a 
set of beliefs and/or practices that is qualitatively similar to that of the Luddites without 
probably having ever heard of the latter (Ruben 2013b, 8; see also Ruben 2013a, 38). 
Ruben agrees with Williams in that not much hangs on such cases. Indeed, no social 
dispute with a second group (say Neo-Luddites) can arise if the anti-global capitalist 
activists are not even aware of the existence of their congenial predecessors. And hardly 
any scholar – certainly not a historian of political thought from Cambridge – will do all 
she can to supply the later group with the general recognition as true successor by 
arguing that SY in WY corresponds to SX in WX. Hence, if not much hangs on such cases, 
we need not take them into account in the present discussion. 
 
Modification 3 
 
a set of beliefs and/or practices 
 
The third modification is only meant to affirm that a true successor is always a 
predecessor’s true successor in some respect, i.e. in some selected beliefs, in some 
selected practices, or in some selected beliefs and practices. I also conjecture that rival 
claimants to true successorhood are usually aware and ready to admit that they consider 
many beliefs and practices that their predecessor has displayed to be irrelevant for the 
question of true successorhood. The New Wittgensteinians will not dispute the claim of 
(other groups of) analytic philosophers to be the true successors of Wittgenstein on the 
basis that they ignore the young Wittgenstein’s private letters, that they are disinclined to 
play the clarinet or volunteer for the army. In addition to the varying emphases that rivals 
may lay on the common predecessor’s individual beliefs and practices, their social 
dispute may thus also be caused by their consideration of different sets of beliefs and/or 
practices as relevant for the question of true successorhood.  
 
While I believe that this small modification has been implicitly assumed in the 
discussion, the point is noteworthy because it provides an alternative line of justification 
of why Obama might legitimately claim to be Washington’s true successor irrespective of 
a possible convergence of ideas. Lebens argued that Obama might wish to argue that 
Washington would – if resurrected from the dead – approve of him as true successor 
simply because of the historical chain of transmission of the office, while Payton replied 
that the conceptual structure for dealing with issues of true successorhood and inheritance 
of a tradition should not include political offices (Lebens 2013b, 67; Payton 2013b, 14). 
Yet, if we assume that Obama’s claim to true successorshood is predicated upon the 
similarity in some selected practices such as that of running (successfully) for office of 
POTUS, we do not need to integrate the criterion of counter-factual approval in our 
concept, nor (directly) the political offices or the historical chain of transmission of the 
office. Perhaps, however, the question should be raised as to whether we need another 
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alternative or supplementary condition for the legitimate claim to true succession, such as 
factual approval, in order to get hold of the historically significant cases of hereditary 
succession (cf. Williams’s example of The Old Pretender, Williams 2013, 43). 
 
On a related note, it should be added that Lebens has indeed a point when bringing up the 
idea of counter-factual approval. In many political and religious disputes over true 
succession, the predecessor’s approval is precisely what the rivals consider the decisive 
category. The rivals will thus agree that true succession is a matter of fact, perhaps they 
will even both believe that the fact is epistemologically accessible, yet disagree about just 
how exactly the predecessor’s (counter-factual) approval is to be verified (i.e. which of 
the predecessor’s beliefs and/or practices are relevant and how they should be weighted). 
The reason for their disagreement will then be epistemological in nature. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
What these considerations, to expand on Lebens (2013a, 31), ultimately point at, is that 
the denial of epistemological inaccessibility is just as complementary and equally 
important an explanation for the existence and intractability of social disputes over true 
succession as the denial of vagueness. Just as most rivals in such disputes are likely to 
deny that there can be more than one true successor to a predecessor, they will often 
believe to know how to verify true succession (think, for instance of the papal 
infallibility). Actually, it seems to me that when taken together, the denial of 
epistemological inaccessibility and vagueness form a necessary condition for social 
disputes over true succession to defy rational solution: 
 
The disbelief of at least one rivalling party in the epistemological 
inaccessibility and the disbelief of at least one rivalling party in the 
inherent vagueness of the general idea of true succession taken together, 
as opposed to individually, constitutes a necessary condition for a 
religious, political, etc. dispute to last, and perhaps exacerbate into a 
violent conflict. 
 
If one or more of the rivalling parties assumes that there can only be one true successor, a 
dispute and potentially violent conflict may, but need not, erupt. Such a situation does not 
necessarily lead to a dispute in which at least one of the rival parties insists that it, but not 
its rival(s), is the true successor of some earlier group or person because all parties may 
agree that there is no way to verify whose claim is correct. The parties involved are 
bound to tolerate the others. The most they can do is to try “winning” the others “over” 
by means of deliberation about orthodoxy and orthopraxy (cf. also Asad 1996, 398-402). 
On the other hand, it is also possible that a dispute is settled even though one (or more) of 
the parties involved claims to know for sure how to verify whether some person or group 
is a true successor of some earlier person or group, if it assumes that true succession is a 
many-one relation and if it (they) reach(es) the conclusion that the sets of practices and/or 
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beliefs of all rivals are equally qualitatively similar to the predecessor’s set of practices 
and/or beliefs.  
 
However, a necessary condition for a dispute about true succession to possibly lead to a 
violent conflict is probably that the rivals see in the predecessor's set of beliefs and/or 
practices something more than a rational authority, which is why academic disputes 
concerning true succession will usually not (and arguably should not) comprise a 
potential for violence. Unless the rivals consider true succession to be a hagiographic 
issue that is commanded by the personal authority of the predecessor, they are unlikely to 
mount the barricades. Even if Ruben, Rawls, Dworkin, Lukes, or Swanton were equally 
inclined to claim that only their interpretation of Gallie is correct – to take up an implicit 
example of disputes over true succession provided by Ruben (2013a, 34) – each of them 
should abandon their claim to true succession and tolerate, for the sake of academia, that 
their respective interpretation of Gallie be generally viewed as their own, rather than 
Gallie’s, original theory.  
 
Contact Details: martin.beckstein@philos.uzh.ch 
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